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4Abstract
The platform economy has been criticized for exacerbating social inequalities in va-
rious ways. This study draws on these discussions and examines the extent to which 
social inequalities are being reproduced, reduced, or even increased within platform 
work. The first central question is that of the precariousness of this form of work and 
the vulnerability of the platform workers as a group. This is followed by a second 
question about the role of classical dimensions of inequality of education and gender 
within the group of platform workers. The study focuses on inequalities related to 
income, workload, and the subjective perception of platform work. It follows a com-
parative approach, building on institutionalist analyses developed in labor market and 
inequality research. The empirical analysis is based on case studies of 15 crowdwork 
platforms in the United States and Germany and on an online survey of crowdworkers 
in both countries. While platforms represent a global organizational model, they are 
embedded in different models of capitalism. The study shows that existing labor mar-
ket segmentation and social welfare systems determine who works on platforms and 
to what extent. The weaker the social safety net, the more likely platform work is to 
be both a curse and a blessing: It offers a much needed and flexible source of income, 
albeit under extremely precarious conditions. The stronger the social safety net, on the 
other hand, the greater the market power of workers vis-à-vis the platforms.
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Introduction
The development of the platform economy has engendered both high expectations 
and fierce criticism. The great expectations came, for the most part, in the early ye-
ars, when this economic form was still typically called the “sharing economy,” a title 
that emphasized how a peer-to-peer economy could generate income and change the 
world of work (cf. Vallas/Schor 2020). As the platform economy has come of age, 
however, criticism has grown. A number of studies have accused it of exacerbating 
social inequalities in various ways. For example, some have criticized it for creating 
a precarious employment sector characterized by low wages and a lack of social pro-
tection (MacDonald/Giazitzoglu 2019; De Stefano 2016) and for lacking mechanisms 
to represent workers’ interests (Hoose et al. 2019). Scholars have also criticized the 
frequent discrimination based on gender, age, or ethnicity (Cherry 2019a; Van Doorn 
2017; Piasna/Drahokoupil 2017). The platforms’ far-reaching control mechanisms pla-
ce their workers, who are supposed, at least theoretically, to operate independently of 
the company, in a position of high dependence (Cutolo/Kenney 2019; Gerber/Krzyw-
dzinski 2019; Wood et al. 2018).
This study draws on these discussions and examines the extent to which social inequa-
lities are being reproduced, reduced, or even increased within platform work. The first 
central question is that of the precariousness of this form of work and the vulnerability 
of the platform workers as a group. This is followed by a second question about the 
role of classical dimensions of inequality of education and gender within the group of 
platform workers. We are interested in inequalities related to income, workload, and 
the subjective perception of platform work.
The major contribution of the present study lies in its comparative approach, building 
on institutionalist analyses developed in labor market and inequality research (Benassi 
et al. 2016; Emmeneger et al. 2012). The empirical analysis is based on case studies of 
15 crowdwork platforms in the United States and Germany and on an online survey of 
crowdworkers in both countries. Our starting point is the expectation that country-spe-
cific institutional arrangements (especially with regard to labor market regulation and 
social security) shape inequality structures within platform work. This perspective 
has hardly been pursued in the field of platform work to date, not least because the 
platform economy explicitly presents itself as a global model that is not limited by 
institutional constraints. Our analysis picks up on and continues initial work on the 
institutional conditions under which the platform economy emerged (Rahman/Thelen 
2019; Friedman 2014).
6Platform work is a broad term that has not been used entirely consistently in the lite-
rature. Hence, before continuing, we will give a brief overview of the concept. What 
all forms of platform work share is their use of an “on-demand” market of formally in-
dependent workers organized via internet-based platforms. There are, however, major 
differences between the platforms regarding the importance of space. Platforms such 
as Uber, Deliveroo, MyHammer, or Helpling act as intermediaries for service activi-
ties that are delivered locally and are therefore location-dependent. Platforms such as 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) or Upwork, on the other hand, focus on location-in-
dependent jobs that are done online and by a largely anonymous mass of people, the 
so-called crowd. This latter model is referred to as crowdwork. There are certain diffe-
rences between location-dependent and location-independent forms of platform work. 
For example, collective worker organization is much more possible in location-depen-
dent forms of platform work than in crowdwork. At the same time, however, there are 
also great similarities between the different forms of platform work. Thus, although 
our own empirical analysis focuses on crowdwork, we discuss the state of the research 
and our conclusions in a broader context and use the more general term platform work.
State of the research
Platform work and social inequality
From a formal point of view, platform work is a special kind of digitally organized solo 
self-employment.4 What unites the various models of platform work is that the wor-
kers are registered as self-employed, they usually receive a piece wage, and they can 
be called up “on-demand.” Crowdworking has further special features due to its so-
cio-technical configuration; unlike Uber drivers, for example, crowdworkers can work 
at any time and from any place. This limits their opportunities to talk to one another, 
collectively organize, and engage in interest representation (Gerber 2020a; Howcroft/
Bergvall-Kåreborn 2018; Lehdonvirta 2016).
With regard to the connection between platform work and social inequality, three 
aspects can be distinguished. The first question is which social groups take up plat-
form work and how they differ from other groups. Second, it is important to consider 
the conditions of platform work: Is it a particularly precarious form of employment or 
does it also offer opportunities – in other words, is platform work an “elevator to the 
top,” a guarantee of social status, or an “elevator to the bottom”? Third, it is possible 
4  Jonas Ferdinand (WZB) supported us in the writing of this section.
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to investigate differences between different groups of platform workers in terms of 
income, working hours, and other variables.
Regarding the first question, namely of the socio-demographic characteristics of plat-
form workers, the statistics collected to date are very imprecise. Depending on the met-
hods and definitions used, the estimated size of this employment segment in Germany 
and the United States varies between less than 1% and about 4% of the workforce 
(Bonin/Zinne 2017; Serfling 2018; Jackson et al. 2017). Few systematic country-com-
parative studies on the socio-demographic composition of platform workers have been 
conducted to date. With regard to crowdwork, the available literature has focused on 
individual countries or platforms; for example, it has looked at crowdworkers on AMT 
in the United States and India (Diffalah et al. 2018; Ipeirotis 2010) or professional free-
lancers on Upwork (Popiel 2017; Gandini 2016). In addition, there are some studies 
of crowdwork in Germany (Schneider-Dörr 2019; Serfling 2018; Bonin et al. 2017; 
Pongratz/Bormann 2017), while the US studies mostly consider platform work in a 
broader sense (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018; Smith 2016; Farrell/Greig 2016). For 
Germany, studies indicate that most crowdworkers tend to be male and have higher 
educational attainment than the population average. Compared to other solo self-em-
ployed people, crowdworkers are also significantly younger. Initial estimates of the 
global crowdwork workforce and its composition are available in Berg et al (2018).
For the second question concerning working conditions on the platforms in compari-
son with other forms of employment, existing studies have reached different conclu-
sions. Some studies point to the opportunities for weaker groups in the labor market, 
e.g., ex-convicts, physically or mentally disabled people, or even single parents (Car-
chio 2019; Zyskowski et al. 2015). Crowdwork also offers the opportunity to reduce 
regional and even global employment and income inequalities by enabling people to 
take advantage of opportunities in labor markets beyond their region (Berg et al. 2018; 
Beerepoot/Lambregts 2015). In this way, people in structurally weak areas or in the 
Global South can benefit from a demand for labor generated in metropolitan areas or 
in the Global North (Graham et al. 2017; Thies et al 2011). Yet, this literature on the 
benefits of platform work is contrasted by a rapidly growing body of research that 
addresses its negative effects, particularly on social inequality. Scholars have argued 
that platform work is creating a particularly precarious form of solo self-employment 
(De Stefano 2016), i.e., that a new large category of marginalized work is being es-
tablished, thus increasing social inequality. The mechanisms of this precarization are 
flexibilization and disempowerment.
8The flexibilization argument refers to the form of remuneration on platforms and the 
lack of social welfare benefits (Berg et al. 2018). Platform work is usually remune-
rated per task performed, which can amount to a few cents for tagging a picture or a 
few euros for a short product description; on so-called competition platforms, such as 
99designs, platform workers take part in competitions and go away empty-handed if 
their work is not among the selected winners (De Stefano 2016). Since platform wor-
kers are formally registered as self-employed, they are also not entitled to social wel-
fare benefits, health insurance, paid holidays, or protection against dismissal (Huws et 
al. 2016). For high-wage countries, this means that part of the labor market is being 
disembedded and de facto integrated into a global low-wage labor market: “the sun 
never sets on Amazon’s technology platform” (Irani 2015: 726).
Flexibility is also promoted by ranking systems, which are a key means of labor regu-
lation on platforms (Kellog et al. 2020; Gandini 2016; Lee et al., 2015). A core com-
ponent is the constant assessment of work quality, either by the customer or (in online 
work) by other crowdworkers. Depending on the platform and type of work, further 
criteria may be added, and these criteria may or may not be transparent. On many plat-
forms, the ranking systems take into account factors such as activity on the platform, 
speed of answers to customer queries, or engagement in community discussions (Ger-
ber/Krzywdzinski 2019). This leads to crowdworkers being forced to be active on the 
platforms on weekends or in the evening (Berg et al. 2018; Wood et al. 2018).
The disempowerment argument points to the special forms of control on platforms; 
these differ from both regular employment relationships and classic self-employment 
and contribute to the vulnerability of platform workers in comparison to other social 
groups. Many studies on both location-dependent and location-independent platform 
work emphasize the information and power asymmetries between platforms, clients 
and workers (Gerber 2020b; Ivanova et al. 2018). Cutolo and Kenney (2019: 13–18) 
describe the mechanisms that cause the disempowerment of platform workers as fol-
lows:
1) Platforms control the terms of trade and can change them unilaterally.
2) Platforms control workers’ access to information on available jobs, prices etc., 
while they themselves have complete information on the entire market.
3) Platforms control the interface between customers and workers, i.e., they can (de-
pending on the platform and type of work) withhold all information about the 
customers from the workers.
4) Platforms can bar workers from accessing the platform, and thus customers, at 
will.
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5) Platforms define the ranking and reputation systems, which have an enormous 
influence on platform workers’ access to jobs. The criteria of the ranking and re-
putation systems are often kept secret to prevent opportunistic behavior and ma-
nipulation.
With regard to the third question, namely that of inequalities between different groups 
of platform workers, the research argues that platforms reproduce and sometimes in-
tensify existing discrimination and thus social inequality on the labor market. Many of 
the markets in which platforms act as intermediaries have historically been characteri-
zed by gender inequalities (Van Doorn 2017). Platforms that allow crowdworkers to be 
selected based on their profiles may reproduce stereotype-based selection mechanisms 
(Cherry 2019a; Foong et al. 2019). Adams and Berg (2017) compared the wages of 
crowdworkers in the United States by gender and showed that women earn about $1 
less per hour than men. Foong et al (2018) showed that such wage differences also 
exist for crowdworkers on Upwork. Leung and Koppman (2015) showed that women 
have a considerable disadvantage when working on programming platforms due to 
gender stereotypes among the clients. Huws et al. (2016), however, argued in their 
comparative study of Germany, Sweden, Austria, and Great Britain that platform work 
sometimes enables women to take on typically male-connoted work – so platforms 
could also help reduce gender differences in the labor market.
Platform work and country-specific institutional 
systems
In the research, the image that pervades is that of platform work as a global model that 
defies national regulation and is thus completely unembedded (Cherry 2019b; Berg 
et al. 2018). This means that the research on platform work contrasts with existing 
research on social inequality, which emphasizes the role of institutional arrangements 
(Häusermann et al. 2019; Benassi et al. 2016).
In particular, research on the dualization of labor markets and societies has emphasi-
zed the role of country-specific institutional arrangements (Schwander 2019; Emme-
negger et al. 2012). The key argument of this research is that, in contemporary socie-
ties, we are observing a tendency to segregate regular and secure employment from 
a growing margin of precarious employment in response to globalization processes 
and competition for location. However, this tendency varies from country to country 
and depends on the institutional arrangement of labor market regulation and welfare 
state protection. Labor market regulation determines how far dualization processes can 
go through rules for the use of temporary work, fixed-term contracts, and protection 
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against dismissal. The welfare state in turn influences the vulnerability of precarious 
groups and thus their position on the labor market (Gerstung 2019).
The institutional differences in labor market regulation and welfare state security in 
Germany and the United States – which are the countries this study focuses on – have 
been well researched (Kaufmann 2003). There has certainly been a rapprochement 
between the two welfare state regimes (Seeleib-Kaiser 2014). In both countries, claims 
under the pension and unemployment insurance systems have declined in recent de-
cades. At the same time, precarious forms of employment have increased in Germany 
due to the deregulation of the labor market (e.g., with regard to the possibilities of 
using temporary work), the decline in collective bargaining coverage, and the out-
sourcing of workers by companies. As a result, the low-wage sector has expanded and 
the number of self-employed workers has also increased (Grabka/Schröder 2019; ILO 
2017). Nevertheless, there are a number of regime differences between Germany and 
the US that are relevant to our analysis:
• Protection in the event of unemployment (especially for the long-term unemploy-
ed) and illness – i.e., the decommodification of labor – is still significantly higher 
in Germany than in the United States, where there is no universal minimum welfa-
re benefit system and a large proportion of employees do not have health insurance 
at all (Seeleib-Kaiser 2014). The German system offers parental leave benefits that 
do not exist in the United States. Moreover, the costs of childcare are significantly 
lower in Germany (Kröger 2011; Henderson/White 2004). We therefore expect 
platform work to be an important source of income for the groups of precarious 
solo self-employed persons in the United States as well as for parents and single 
parents, whereas in Germany, these groups can rely on social welfare benefits and 
may not need to do platform work. The large gaps in welfare-benefit coverage of 
the population in the United States will also likely lead to greater geographical in-
equalities. Especially in poorer rural regions, platform work could be an important 
source of income.
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• The institutional features described here have shaped a culture in the United States 
that emphasizes entrepreneurship and rejects collective responsibility for citizens’ 
social wellbeing (Richter et al 2018; Seeleib-Kaiser 2014). In addition, the distinc-
tion between dependent employment and solo self-employment is less clear-cut in 
the United States, as the legal protection against dismissal is very weak and most 
dependent employees are not entitled to benefits like for instance the continued 
payment of wages during sickness leave. On this basis, we can expect platform 
work to be more accepted in the United States than in Germany. On the one hand, 
such precarious independence is considered “normal” due to the lack of alternati-
ves. On the other hand, it is consistent with a model of individual assumption of 
responsibility.
• The United States has been characterized by a particularly pronounced long-term 
trend of weakening trade unions (encouraged by state policy) and by rather an-
tagonistic relations between companies and trade unions (Cutcher-Gershenfeld/
Kochan 2004). By contrast, cooperation between trade unions, companies, and the 
state is much more pronounced in Germany, despite all existing conflicts. We can 
expect these differences to be reflected in the nature of the debate on the regulation 
of platform work. While we could expect more open conflicts in the United States, 
we would expect attempts at a negotiated approach between the state, companies, 
and trade unions in Germany.
Comparative analyses of the regulation of the platform economy and the role of in-
stitutional frameworks are still a relatively new phenomenon. Recently, some initial 
analyses of how institutional factors influence platform work have been presented. 
Some authors have pointed out that platform work has emerged from a specifically 
US regulatory context (Van Doorn 2017). Drawing on Friedman (2014), we can also 
understand platform work as a digital intensification of the atypical work that has been 
spreading since the 1970s. Rahman and Thelen (2019) have also described platforms 
as a further development of the outsourcing strategies that sought to enhance share-
holder value. Using the example of Uber, Thelen (2018) analyzed the special role US 
institutions and regulation played in the development of the platform. Although Uber 
met with resistance from taxi companies in the United States, it was able to win the 
conflict by successfully mobilizing users (cf. Thelen 2018: 945). However, this led to 
regulatory responses at the municipal or even state level, for example, in New York 
or California (De Stefano 2016; Isaac et al. 2015). In the case of Germany, the few 
currently existing studies on the subject have discussed the role of trade unions such as 
ver.di and IG Metall in regulating platform work (Haipeter/Hoose 2019). These unions 
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have started organizing activities for platform workers, initiated dialogue processes 
with German platforms, and brought the issue to the political stage.
The present study builds on existing analyses but undertakes an explicit comparative 
analysis of crowdwork and its regulation in the United States and Germany.
Data
In the analysis, we used data from the project “Between digital bohemia and precarity. 
Work and performance in the crowd” (2016–2019), which was funded by the Thyssen 
Foundation. The analysis focused on crowdwork as a specific form of platform work. 
The project combined qualitative and quantitative methods. In the qualitative part of the 
data collection and analysis, 15 case studies of crowdwork platforms in Germany and the 
United States were conducted. The central question concerned the extent to which the 
different institutional regimes in Germany and the United States influenced the work and 
performance regulation on the platforms. In particular, the study examined approaches 
to the recruitment of crowdworkers, the control and regulation of performance (incen-
tive and remuneration systems), and communication with crowdworkers. The case stu-
dies were based on an analysis of platform websites and official documents, their work 
interfaces for crowdworkers, and their communication forums. The study also involved 
conducting 32 one- to two-hour semi-structured interviews with representatives of the 
platforms (Gerber/Krzywdzinski 2019; Gerber 2020a).
The platform-selection process took place in several steps. Our central aim was to inclu-
de platforms that focused on different types of work (in terms of task content and skill 
requirements). We distinguished between two task types: micro- and macrotasks. Micro-
tasks can be defined as routine tasks (e.g., image categorization, lead data verification, 
short audio transcriptions) or as tasks that do not require specific knowledge (e.g., short 
product descriptions, testing of apps). The nature of these tasks allows them to be broken 
down into short and standardized components that can be completed within seconds 
or minutes. Several crowdworkers can work simultaneously on the same task without 
having to interact. Macrotasks, by contrast, are complex and require a high degree of 
creativity and specific, sometimes professional knowledge (e.g., design activities, soft-
ware programming, development of product concepts, scientific problem solving). The-
se tasks cannot be broken down and are therefore organized as projects lasting several 
days or weeks. The focus is on quality. Platforms often organize competitions to generate 
proposals, from which the client, a jury, or the crowd community can select the winners.
To select the platforms, we compiled a list of all platforms in Germany and selected 
metropolitan regions in the United States (Bay Area, Boston, Chicago, New York) on 
Varieties of platform work 13
the basis of internet research. We identified 60 platforms, which we contacted in several 
rounds by phone and email. We continued to contact them until we reached a sample of 
15 case studies that equally represented micro- and macroplatforms.
The qualitative analysis showed that the central differences in the design of work and 
performance regulation related to differences in task types between platforms (micro- 
versus macrotasks); there were hardly any differences between German and US plat-
forms. Apparently, crowdwork is indeed a global model, in that the platforms apply si-
milar organizational principles (Gerber/Krzywdzinski 2019).
In the following, we will analyze the quantitative survey of crowdworkers. The survey 
was sent to crowdworkers who registered as German or US residents on the platforms. 
The total sample consists of 1,131 participants; however, those participants who stated 
in the survey that their main residence was not in Germany or the United States were 
excluded from the analysis; this may be the case if the crowdworkers work as “global 
nomads.” Accordingly, the sample used here comprises 1,088 persons.
On four platforms, the survey was placed on the platform as a paid task. On the other 
platforms, the survey invitation was sent to the crowdworkers via the platform itself or 
(if the platforms refused to participate in the survey) via social media (Facebook, Linke-
dIn, Reddit, Xing) and the platforms’ communication forums.
In our case studies, we received information from the platforms about the composition 
of the crowdworkers by gender and age. We used this information to calculate plat-
form-specific weighting variables. In terms of gender, our sample composition deviated 
only slightly from the actual composition of the crowdworkers on the platforms survey-
ed, but crowdworkers under 35 years of age were noticeably underrepresented. We used 
a weighting variable to correct for this.
Our data therefore represent a “convenience sample,” which means we cannot general-
ize beyond the platforms we surveyed. However, the platforms we surveyed represent 
a total of 14 million registered crowdworkers, which is a considerable proportion of 
the total number of workers in this sector. Our sample is also broadly similar in com-
position to those of the available studies on Germany (Bonin/Zinne 2017; Leimeister 
et al. 2016) as well as on the United States (Difallah et al. 2018; Popiel 2017).
An advantage of our sample is that we covered platforms with different types of tasks 
in one survey, thus avoiding a focus on individual platforms, which is the dominant 
approach in the current research. Second, we surveyed German and US crowdworkers 
on the same platforms, which is an important basis for this comparison. The following 
table, Table 1, provides information on our sample.
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Table 1. Socio-demographic composition of the sample
Germany United States
Gender
Women 44.8% 53.8%
Men 55.0% 45.2%
Other/third gender 0.2% 1.0%
Age
Up to 21 years 10.1% 8.5%
22–29 37.0% 31.4%
30–39 30.0% 30.2%
40–49 12.6% 16.1%
50–64 10.3% 11.5%
Above 65 0.9% 2.4%
Education High-school diploma 
and below
44.4% 31.1%
Tertiary degree 55.6% 68.9%
Platform type Microtasks 88.0% 62.2%
Macrotasks 12.0% 37.8%
N 576 512
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
In the US subsample, the majority of workers were women; in the German one, the 
majority were men. This corresponds with the findings of existing studies. There is 
thus a certain imbalance in our sample, which results from the fact that macrotask 
platforms in Germany had lower response rates than those in the United. This also 
means that workers with a tertiary education are more strongly represented in the US 
subsample than in the German one. This makes it necessary to consider the platform 
type (micro/macro) when doing country comparisons.
The questionnaire used in the survey consists of 29 questions and covered the follo-
wing topics: (a) basic information about the work situation (working hours, type of 
tasks etc.); (b) the form of performance monitoring on the platform; (c) reputation and 
ranking systems; (d) interaction with other crowdworkers; (e) perception of working 
conditions and stress; and (f) socio-demographic information (age, gender etc.).
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The working conditions and income situations of the 
crowdworkers
With regard to the time spent by crowdworkers on platform work, there were clear 
differences between Germany and the United States (Table 2). In Germany, crowdwor-
kers spent considerably less time on platforms: two thirds of the respondents worked 
on their platforms for a maximum of 10 hours per week. This suggests that crowdwork 
was a secondary activity for this group. In the United States, on the other hand, 35% 
of those surveyed worked more than 20 hours a week on the platforms – here, it can be 
assumed that platform work was the main source of income. Only 40% of respondents 
performed platform work as a small part-time job of 10 hours or less per week.
Table 2. Typical weekly working time on platforms of crowdworkers in Germany 
and the United States by gender and educational attainment
1–10 
hours
11–20 
hours
21–30 
hours
31–40 
hours
More than 
40 hours
Germany
Men 66.1% 20.8% 10.1% 3.0% 0%
Women 63.2% 20.6% 10.8% 3.8% 1.7%
High-school or less 63.5% 23.4% 8.4% 3.3% 1.4%
Tertiary education 65.7% 18.0% 11.7% 3.4% 1.2%
United States
Men 40.2% 24.2% 19.0% 8.9% 7.6%
Women 40.8% 23.5% 18.8% 11.5% 5.4%
High-school or less 38.5% 18.6% 22.4% 12.6% 7.9%
Tertiary education 41.5% 26.0% 17.5% 9.1% 5.8%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
These differences may have been related to the different compositions of the German 
and US subsamples with regard to platform type: Microtask platform workers are cle-
arly more represented in the German than in the US subsample. We thus took the plat-
form type into account. However, even when we did so, the picture hardly changed. 
If only microtask platforms were considered, the share of German crowdworkers who 
worked a maximum of 10 hours per week was 64.1%; in the US case, it was 45.6%. In 
Germany, 13.5% of crowdworkers on microtask platforms worked 20 hours or more 
compared to 37.0% in the United States.
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With regard to working time, there were no significant gender differences on the plat-
forms in either country. In Germany, there were also no statistically significant differen-
ces between different education levels. In the United States, on the other hand, people 
without tertiary education had higher weekly working hours on platforms; this figure 
was statistically significant (p<0.05). This suggests that crowdwork is more often a main 
source of income for the non-tertiary-educated group in the United States.
Table 3. Primary employment status of crowdworkers in Germany
Men Women High-school 
education
Tertiary 
education
Microtask platforms
Employed (Full time) 39.3% 21.7% 30.8% 32.4%
Employed (Part time) 12.1% 11.6% 8.7% 14.6%
Self-employed 17.9% 24.3% 17.7% 24.0%
University/Education 22.2% 20.1% 29.9% 13.4%
Other (retired, registered 
unemployed)
8.5% 22.3% 12.9% 15.6%
Macrotask platforms
Employed (Full time) 23.1% 6.0% 8.3% 16.7%
Employed (Part time) 10.3% 33.3% 8.3% 23.3%
Self-employed 59.0% 42.4% 58.3% 50.0%
University/Education 2.6% 3.0% 8.3% 1.7%
Other (retired, registered 
unemployed)
5.1% 15.1% 16.7% 8.3%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
The similarities and differences between Germany and the United States are evident 
when we look at employment status (Tables 3 and 4). Here, we separately considered 
crowdworkers on micro- and macrotask platforms. The majority of crowdworkers on 
microtasks platforms in both countries also had a regular job or attended university; in 
both countries, the majority of crowdworkers on macrotask platforms were self-employ-
ed. In both Germany and the United States, the employment status also reflected the clas-
sic gender inequalities on the labor market. Men who did crowdwork were much more 
likely than women to have a regular full-time job, while women working on platforms 
were much more likely than men to have a regular part-time job or no other job at all.
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Table 4. Primary employment status of crowdworkers in the United States
Men Women High-school 
education
Tertiary 
education
Microtask platforms
Employed (Full time) 44.9% 27.3% 18.7% 43.4%
Employed (Part time) 16.1% 21.5% 16.3% 21.4%
Self-employed 21.4% 23.2% 28.8% 18.7%
University/Education 7.7% 5.9% 9.5% 5.4%
Other (retired, regis-
tered unemployed)
9.8% 22.1% 26.8% 11.1%
Macrotask platforms
Employed (Full time) 29.3% 19.2% 15.4% 26.8%
Employed (Part time) 13.0% 8.1% 7.7% 11.1%
Self-employed 43.5% 49.5% 48.7% 45.7%
University/Education 2.2% 5.0% 7.7% 2.6%
Other (retired, regis-
tered unemployed)
12.0% 18.2% 20.5% 13.7%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
There were differences between Germany and the United States, especially with regard to 
the role of education. First, a much larger proportion of crowdworkers in Germany than in 
the United States used this activity as a secondary source of income during their university 
education. Second, there were differences between education levels. In Germany, the dif-
ferences in employment status between crowdworkers with and without tertiary education 
appear relatively small – at least if we focus on crowdworkers on microtask platforms and 
ignore crowdworkers on macrotask platforms because of the small number of cases. In the 
United States, on the other hand, there were large differences between people with diffe-
rent education levels. University-educated crowdworkers were much more likely to have 
a regular full-time or part-time job while those without a university education were much 
more likely to be self-employed or without any other employment.
Table 5 confirms the findings presented so far. In Germany, only 16% of the surveyed 
crowdworkers reported that their platform income accounted for more than 50% of 
their total income. In the United States, the figure was just under 33%. Here, too, this 
difference between Germany and the United States applied to crowdworkers on both 
microtask and macrotask platforms.
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Table 5. Share of platform income in total income of crowdworkers in Germany and 
the United States
Less than 25% 25-50% 51-75% More than 75%
Germany 71.4% 12.5% 5.0% 11.1%
United States 47.2% 20.2% 9.0% 23.6%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
How can we interpret these findings? They confirm our initial expectation that the 
different levels of decommodification of labor in Germany and the United States are 
related to the role of crowdwork as a source of income. In the United States, which has 
low social welfare benefits, crowdwork is an important opportunity to generate income 
if no other options are available on the local labor market. Despite its precariousness, 
crowdwork is often the primary source of income in the United States because no alter-
natives are available. In Germany, on the other hand, crowdwork is much more often a 
secondary activity. This could be explained by the fact that there are fewer incentives 
to use crowdwork as a primary source of income in the German context, where indivi-
duals enjoy relatively high social welfare benefit levels. Another explanation could be 
the strong growth of part-time employment and of so-called “mini jobs” in Germany, 
which, given their low wages, create the need for additional income.
In both countries, women and crowdworkers without tertiary education were more de-
pendent on income from platform work than men and college graduates. On the one 
hand, this reproduces the classical inequalities. On the other hand, crowdwork can also 
be interpreted as an opportunity: It represents a new kind of access to income for these 
groups, which makes them a little more independent of the local labor market.
Subjective perceptions of platform work
To what extent are the differences in crowdworkers’ objective work situations also 
reflected in their subjective perceptions of platform work? An interesting finding in Ta-
bles 6 and 7 is that crowdworkers in the United States are significantly more satisfied 
with their platform work than those in Germany and they also more frequently see this 
type of work as a long-term prospect. This difference applies to both crowdworkers on 
micro- and macrotask platforms, i.e., regardless of the type of task.
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Table 6. “Overall I am satisfied with working on the platform.”
Strongly 
agree
Agree Partly Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Germany 19.7% 46.3% 24.7% 8.5% 0.7%
United States 31.0% 46.9% 17.5% 3.2% 1.3%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
Table 7. “I see my personal future in platform work.”
Strongly 
agree
Agree Partly Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Germany 6.5% 17.1% 20.9% 23.6% 31.8%
United States 15.7% 26.4% 28.3% 18.9% 10.7%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
Research on job satisfaction has shown that measurements of subjective satisfaction 
do not provide information on objective working conditions (cf. Brown et al. 2012) – 
people are often satisfied with forms of work and employment that are poor and stress-
ful according to objective criteria. It is therefore important to reflect on the reasons for 
satisfaction. There are two possible explanations for the findings presented here. On 
the one hand, the differences in satisfaction between German and US crowdworkers 
may represent the commodification of labor. In the US system, which provides limited 
social welfare benefits, platform work reduces dependence on the local labor market; 
thus despite all the burdens, it can be perceived as a gain in autonomy and can lead to 
higher satisfaction. On the other hand, our findings may also reflect general cultural 
differences between Germany and the United States. In international surveys, Ame-
ricans tend to be slightly more satisfied with their work than Germans (Souza-Posa/
Souza-Posa 2000). In addition, self-employment enjoys greater recognition in the Uni-
ted States than in Germany and the uncertainties of self-employment are perceived as 
more socially normal than in Germany.
Interestingly, however, the following two tables, Table 8 and 9, show that US workers’ 
greater satisfaction with crowdwork is accompanied by a higher level of perceived inse-
curity and a higher degree of work stress than is evident in the German subsample. Given 
the greater importance of platform incomes for US crowdworkers, this is not surprising.
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Table 8. “The uncertainty of whether I will get enough jobs in a month and earn 
enough money worries me a lot.”
Strongly 
agree
Agree Partly Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Germany 7.7% 10.8% 24,5% 23.6% 33.2%
United States 19.0% 19.0% 24.0% 23.4% 14.6%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
Table 9. “I organize my working time according to the work that is available – even 
if this means working late in the evening, at night, or on weekends.”
Strongly 
agree
Agree Partly Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Germany 20.7% 31.5% 23.9% 11.7% 12.2%
United States 39.3% 33.4% 18.0% 5.9% 3.3%
Source: Krzywdzinski/Gerber 2019. Weighted data.
To what extent do the factors that influence the perception of crowdwork differ bet-
ween Germany and the United States (Tables 10 and 11)? Overall, very similar pat-
terns can be observed within the two countries studied. With regard to the question 
of whether crowdwork represents a long-term model for the respondents, the current 
level of platform income proved particularly relevant. People who earned relatively 
high incomes on the platforms planned to continue working there in the future. In both 
countries, people without a tertiary education were also much more likely to see their
personal future in crowdwork. In terms of employment status, self-employed people, 
unemployed people, and retired persons in both countries were more likely to see their 
future in crowdwork than those with regular employment.
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Table 10. Ordinal logistic regression, German subsample (odds ratios in brackets)
“I see my per-
sonal future in 
platform work.”
“The uncertain-
ty of whether I 
will get enough 
jobs in a month 
and earn enough 
money worries 
me a lot.”
“I organize my 
working time 
according to the 
work that is avai-
lable – even if 
this means wor-
king late in the 
evening, at night, 
or on weekends.”
Gender (women compa-
red to men)
.262 (1.300) .053 (1.019) .340 (1.405)
Tertiary education (com-
pared to persons without 
tertiary education)
-.606 (.545)** .116 (1.123) .044 (1.045)
Platform income .417 (1.518)* -.151 (.860) -.052 (.949)
Number of inhabitants of 
the place of residence
-.043 (.958) .111 (1.118) .062 (1.064)
Employed part time 
(compared to full-time 
employment)
.435 (1.545) .667 (1.949)* -.061 (.941)
Self-employed (compared 
to full-time employment)
.638 (1.893)* 1.177 (3.245)** .551 (1.736)*
In education (compared 
to full-time employment)
-.134 (.875) .266 (1.305) -.383 (.682)
Unemployed/retired/other 
(compared to full-time 
employment)
.934 (2.545)** 1.297 (3.658)** .783 (2.188)* 
Age -.011 (.989) -.015 (.985) -.020 (.980)*
Number of children .086 (1.090) -.024 (.976) .078 (1.081)
N 534 547 554
Pseudo R² 0.047 0.046 .034
Significance level * <0.05, **<0.01. Controls: platform, duration of work experience 
on platforms, number of platforms on which the person is registered. Robust standard 
errors. Weighted data.
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Table 11. Ordinal logistic regression, US subsample (odds ratios in brackets)
“I see my per-
sonal future in 
platform work.”
“The uncertain-
ty of whether I 
will get enough 
jobs in a month 
and earn enough 
money worries 
me a lot.”
“I organize my 
working time 
according to the 
work that is avai-
lable – even if 
this means wor-
king late in the 
evening, at night, 
or on weekends.”
Gender (women compared 
to men)
-.017 (.983) .263 (1.301) .282 (1.325)
Tertiary education (com-
pared to persons without 
tertiary education)
-.411 (.663) .210 (1.233) -.598 (.550)*
Platform income .324 (1.383)** -.139 (.870) -.002 (.998)
Number of inhabitants of 
the place of residence
-.289 (.749)** -.008 (.992) .042 (1.042)
Employed part time 
(compared to full-time 
employment)
-.271 (.763) .556 (1.744) .061 (1.063)
Self-employed (compared 
to full-time employment)
.603 (1.827)* .704 (2.022)* .394 (1.483)
In education (compared to 
full-time employment)
-.356 (.700) .523 (1.687) -.035 (.965)
Unemployed/retired/other 
(compared to full-time 
employment)
.844 (2.326)* .319 (1.376) -.009 (.991)
Age .011 (1.011) -.007 (.992) .004 (1.004)
Number of children .224 (1.251)** .021 (1.022) .082 (1.085)
N 431 445 446
Pseudo R² 0.062 0.016 .046
Significance level * <0.05, **<0.01. Controls: platform, duration of work experience 
on platforms, number of platforms on which the person is registered. Robust standard 
errors. Weighted data.
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There were certain differences between Germany and the United States regarding the 
long-term importance of crowdwork. In the United States people living in smaller 
cities were more likely to accept this form of work than people living in metropolitan 
areas – this is plausible, because crowdwork offers particular opportunities in rural 
labor markets. Interestingly, however, this variable was not important in Germany. In 
the United States, the number of children a person had also clearly influenced their 
perception of crowdwork: The more children they had, the more likely they were to see 
crowdwork as their future form of work. This, in turn, can be explained by the lack of 
social welfare benefits, which puts particular pressure on large families, as well as the 
high cost of childcare in the United States.
When it comes to the question of uncertainty, there were again extensive similarities 
between Germany and the United States. In both countries, having a high income from 
platform work counteracted the burden of uncertainty. In both countries, self-employ-
ed people were much more likely to feel insecure than platform workers in regular 
full-time employment; to a lesser extent, this also applied to part-time employees, the 
unemployed, and pensioners. Most other variables had little or no impact.
Likewise, with regard to the allocation of working time, the countries were largely 
similar. In both Germany and the United States, women were slightly more likely than 
men to strongly gear their crowdwork working hours according to demand. People 
in regular full-time employment and students tended to have lower probabilities of 
working on-demand, while the opposite was true for the self-employed. The level of 
platform income had no influence on this. However, a clear difference can be seen with 
regard to education levels. In Germany, the level of education had no influence on how 
flexible and on-demand working hours were. In the United States, by contrast, people 
without a college degree were about twice as likely to report having on-demand wor-
king hours than people with a college degree.
Regulation of platform work in Germany and the 
United States
Particularly in the debate on dualization, scholars have pointed out that labor market 
inequalities and segmentation have an influence on policy formulation (Häusermann/
Schwander 2012). This argument – as we will illustrate below – also applies to the 
platform economy. There have been clear differences in policy responses between 
Germany and the United States. To explain these differences, it was necessary to take 
into account the legal framework for collective action by platform workers. Although 
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our empirical analysis focused on crowdwork, in the following we summarize the re-
gulatory responses to platform work in a broader sense.
The first clear difference in terms of policy responses to the development of platform 
work in Germany and the United States concerns litigation through the courts. In Ger-
many, there has only been one publicly known lawsuit to date: A crowdworker sued 
the Roamler platform (see Zeit Online 2019). He had been working on the platform 
for two years and earned his income from this platform alone, however, the platform 
ultimately terminated his access. In the lawsuit, the crowdworker argued that he was 
de facto employed by the platform and therefore a termination of his access without 
notice was unlawful. The State Labor Court in Munich ruled that there were no charac-
teristics of dependent employment because the crowdworker was not directly bound 
by instructions of the platform and could have refused to accept the offered jobs.
In the United States – and especially in California – there have been a large number of 
class action lawsuits filed by platform workers, almost all of which revolve around the 
question of whether platform workers are in fact dependent employees (Seiner 2017). 
However, the most publicly discussed lawsuits against Uber, Lyft, and Crowdflower 
ended with a settlement in which the platforms paid millions of dollars to the platform 
workers, thus avoiding a court decision on the question of dependent employment. A 
number of other claims have also been dismissed by the courts using similar arguments 
as in Germany (ibid.).
In both countries, the legal disputes have thus revolved around the question of plat-
form workers’ dependence on the platforms. The legal demarcations between depen-
dent employment and solo self-employment differ only slightly between Germany and 
the United States. The central criterion for dependent employment in Germany is the 
direct obligation to follow instructions (Weisungsgebundenheit), which enables the 
employer to determine working hours and work content (cf. Kocher 2012; Müller-Glö-
ge 2020). This is interpreted relatively strictly. In the United States, the primary criteri-
on is the degree of “control” of the employee by the employer – the greater the control, 
the more the relationship between two parties is to be interpreted as an employment 
relationship (Seiner 2017).
There are several explanations for the different numbers of legal disputes in Germany 
and the United States. Differences in the legal system certainly play an important role. 
US law permits class actions under certain conditions, and California has particular-
ly favorable conditions for class actions in the field of labor law (ibid.). Under these 
conditions, and due to the long-standing weakening of trade unions, a trend of moving 
labor disputes from the arena of industrial relations to the courts can be observed in the 
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United States (Colvin 2012). In Germany, there is no such possibility of class actions, 
which makes the conditions for a court-based collective dispute much more difficult. A 
second explanation, however, pertains to the differences in the importance of platform 
work for the respective labor markets. In the United States, platform work is much 
more widespread, and it often represents the main source of income for people. This is 
a much stronger motivation and basis for collective disputes, even if they are carried 
out in court. 
Differences between Germany and the United States in terms of political responses 
to platform work have not only been evident in legal disputes, but also in state po-
licies. In the United States, there has been a conflict between the Republican states 
and federal government – and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) control-
led by it – on the one hand and progressive, Democratic states such as California 
on the other. The NLRB, which oversees compliance with the rules for unionization 
and recognition, considers platform workers to be freelancers and denies them the 
right to unionize (Griswold 2019). A number of Republican states have passed legis-
lation defining platform workers as independent contractors. The conflict is currently 
escalating in California (but also in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut). In 
2019, California Assembly Bill 5 laid down stricter rules for recognition as indepen-
dent contractors (Smith 2019).5 This immediately led to new class actions by platform 
workers (Scheiber 2019) – but also a petition by the three major platforms, Uber, Lyft, 
and DoorDash. In this petition, they formulated an alternative that would exempt the 
platforms from the law and at the same time create additional protections for self-em-
ployed platform workers. To date, they have already collected 1 million signatures and 
can therefore present their alternative to California’s voters in November 2020 (Kerr 
2020).
In Germany, the disputes have been less fierce. The German government has commis-
sioned a number of expert reports and studies on the topic of platform work (Leist et 
al. 2017; Greef/Schröder 2017; Bonin/Rinne 2017) but has not yet decided on specific 
regulatory steps. The “Green Book Working 4.0” (Grünbuch Arbeit 4.0) published by 
the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) formulated two central 
positions. First, the ministry emphasized that the growth of platform work in Germany 
has been limited so far and that there has been no sign of precarization through the 
platforms (BMAS 2015: 175). Second, BMAS has pointed out that the existing ru-
les for determining bogus self-employment have so far been sufficient (BMAS 2015: 
5 Only platform workers who really work without control, who are not active in the same industry as 
the platforms, and who offer their services to several clients are to be classified as self-employed.
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172). At the same time, however, BMAS has stressed that the government must conti-
nue to review the need to protect platform workers (BMAS 2015: 176).
Finally, third – in addition to legal disputes and state action – different approaches 
have also been evident among the trade unions. Both in the United States and in Ger-
many, trade unions have tried to support the organization of platform workers and thus 
to limit and push back against the development of an employment sector that is unre-
gulated by collective agreements. In the United States, unions are mobilizing to tighten 
the regulations on bogus self-employment and support the strikes and class actions of 
platform workers against the platforms (Ghaffary/Campbell 2019). In Germany, too, 
the trade unions are demanding a tightening of the law (Haipeter/Hoose 2019) and 
have supported the above-mentioned lawsuit. However, in Germany, the only example 
of a collective labor dispute organized by platform workers so far involved riders for 
food delivery platforms Deliveroo, Foodora and Lieferando (Degner/Kocher 2018; 
Schreyer/Schrape 2018). Due to the weak mobilization power of the platform workers 
and unions’ lack of experience with platform work, the two strongest trade unions – 
ver.di and IG Metall – have been cautious in their approaches so far and are counting 
on dialogue with the platforms.
IG Metall launched the “Fair Crowd Work” (FCW) portal in 2015. The portal allows 
crowdworkers to find advice, evaluate platforms, and exchange information. In addi-
tion, IG Metall, in cooperation with eight major German platform companies and the 
German Crowdsourcing Association, adopted a code of conduct in 2017 that lays down 
rules for fair platform work. This includes a voluntary commitment to fair payment 
modes and remuneration levels, to appropriate task and time planning, and to feedback 
and transparency. An ombudsman’s office was set up to ensure implementation and to 
settle disputes. To date, this office has dealt with around 30 cases. The services trade 
union ver.di has also set up a consulting center for crowdworkers, which is part of the 
union’s broader advisory services for the self-employed. Like IG Metall, ver.di is also 
in contact with individual platforms. As the conclusion of the code of conduct makes 
clear, platforms in Germany are willing to talk to trade unions. This attempt to regulate 
platform work between companies and trade unions is certainly typical of the traditi-
ons of German industrial relations but may also be related to the fact that platforms in 
the German labor market have to make much greater efforts to ensure the legitimacy 
of platform work than is the case in the United States.
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Conclusions
Does platform work represent a global model that makes the role of national and in-
stitutional differences disappear? Certainly, there are some arguments in favor of this 
strong globalization thesis. Most platforms operate across national borders. Moreover, 
there are hardly any differences between the approaches to labor and performance re-
gulation on the various platforms in different countries (Gerber/Krzywdzinski 2019). 
The platform as an organizational form thus has its origins in the United States (Rah-
man/Thelen 2019) but has become a global phenomenon. However, the platforms are 
embedded in different models of capitalism. This comparison between Germany and 
the United States has shown that institutional factors play a role in two ways.
First, it is apparent that existing labor market segmentation and social welfare systems 
determine who works on platforms and to what extent: In the United States, platform 
work is more often a person’s main source of income; in Germany it is more likely to 
be a secondary source of income, especially during college and university education. 
Accordingly, crowdworkers in the United States perceive the insecurity and burdens 
of platform work much more than their German counterparts. There are also differen-
ces between Germany and the United States with regard to education: In the United 
States, the situation of crowdworkers without tertiary education is much more preca-
rious compared to crowdworkers with tertiary education, while these differences are 
smaller in Germany. In contrast, with regard to gender inequality, there are similarities 
between Germany and the United States. Women working on crowdwork platforms 
are often in a particularly precarious position: They are more likely to be in part-time 
employment or otherwise unemployed, while men more often engage in crowdwork 
alongside full-time employment.
Against this background, it may be surprising to hear that crowdworkers’ satisfaction 
with their work is higher in the United States than in Germany. However, existing re-
search shows that job satisfaction is not an indicator of objective working conditions. 
In the case of crowdwork, it can be assumed that US crowdworkers’ higher satisfac-
tion is due to the fact that they have few alternatives to platform work and therefore 
perceive the flexibility of platform income as a gain in autonomy. In addition, there is 
a greater cultural acceptance of self-employment and insecurity in the United States.
Second, institutional differences can help explain the policy responses. The spread of 
platform work in the United States and its importance as a main source of income has 
led to a large wave of lawsuits in the courts – this is typical for conflict resolution in 
the United States (Colvin 2012). The importance of platform work as a main source of 
income for many platform workers has led individual states such as California to push 
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ahead with regulatory projects. Despite intensive discussions, by contrast, the German 
government has not yet decided to regulate platform work. One reason for this is that 
platform work in Germany is still often an additional income source earned alongside 
regular employment. At the same time, the German government considers the existing 
social welfare system and labor market regulations as sufficient.
Our analysis thus shows that the platform economy can play a very different role in 
different national labor markets. The weaker the social safety net, the more likely 
platform work is to be both a curse and a blessing: It offers a much needed and flexib-
le source of income, albeit under extremely precarious conditions. The stronger the 
social support, on the other hand, the greater the market power of workers vis-à-vis 
the platforms. At the same time, however, the possibilities for individual exit limit the 
willingness of platform workers to organize themselves. It also reduces the pressure 
for regulatory responses.
Despite these differences between Germany and the United States, we are convinced 
that the regulation of platforms should be an issue on the political agenda in both 
countries. First, it is necessary to consider introducing social welfare benefits for plat-
form work, even if this often represents “only” a secondary income source. Second, 
there is a need for regulation with regard to power and information asymmetries in the 
algorithmic management of platforms. This includes securing rights for platform wor-
kers to have a say in determining rules on the platforms (e.g., with regard to the terms 
of trade, performance control, or the design of ranking systems). We need to develop 
ideas for how this participation of the platform workers could be organized.
A limitation of our analysis is our empirical focus on crowdwork, an area in which 
jobs are completed online and thus independent of location. Although we expect that 
our results will essentially also apply to platforms that organize more location-bound 
activities, this requires further research.
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